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(Re)considering New Agents: A Review of Labour Market Intermediaries within 1 
Labour Geography 2 
Bryony Enright 3 
Abstract 4 
The world of work continues to change. Labour markets in most countries are increasingly 5 
shaped by policies of neoliberal deregulation while strategies of flexibility dominate public 6 
policy and corporate strategy across an array of sectors. At the forefront of these changes are 7 
the myriad labour market intermediaries that are used by workers and employees to enhance 8 
their ability to navigate ever more complex and volatile labour markets. For some, mediated 9 
employment, recruitment and work practices mean greater career progression and profit 10 
making ability, but for many others it means increased precarity, vulnerability and insecurity. 11 
This paper critically reviews existing literature within geography on three types of private 12 
labour market intermediary, namely; temporary staffing agencies and contract brokers; 13 
executive search firms and headhunters and; informal intermediaries such as gangmasters. 14 
The final section addresses the future for research in labour geography and, in particular, 15 
suggests new ways in which to broaden our understanding of labour market intermediaries 16 
and their impact on worker agency.  17 
 18 
Introduction 19 
Since the 1970s labour market deregulation and flexible employment practices have led to a 20 
“frenzy of academic and populist speculation about the future of work” (Wills 2009, 442). 21 
Recently described by the Labour Party leader as “nasty, brutish and short-term” (Wintour & 22 
Topping 2012) the contemporary UK labour market, and indeed that of many other countries, 23 
is fundamentally characterised by the increasingly individualised nature of work and the 24 
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growing ‘contractualization’ of employment (Standing, cited in Allen & Henry 1997). For 25 
workers at the lower-end of the labour market this means increased risk and insecurity (Allen 26 
& Henry 1997) whereas, for the “desirably qualified” it can mean enhanced career 27 
development (Wills 2009, 443). Nonetheless, for employees of all types their future success 28 
and security increasingly depends on their ability to navigate ever more complex and volatile 29 
labour markets (Benner 2002). As such, employers and employees across an assortment of 30 
sectors and skill sets are using labour market intermediaries (LMIs) to help them do just that. 31 
Yet, Benner (2002, 86) points out that ‘few studies of labor [sic] markets even recognise the 32 
importance of intermediaries’. This is beginning to change as a growing body of literature 33 
reconsiders the growth and significance of LMIs for workers, employers and labour markets. 34 
This paper reviews the existing geographical literature across three groups of LMIs; 35 
temporary staffing agencies (TSAs) and contract brokers; executive search firms and 36 
headhunters; and the emerging research agenda on informal intermediaries and gangmasters. 37 
The paper then concludes by suggesting how future research can take forward our 38 
understanding of LMIs and their impact on labour agency.  39 
 40 
What are LMIs? 41 
Traditionally the definition of a LMIs referred to the brokering or matching activities in 42 
which employers and job seekers use a third party to help find a ‘best match’ (National 43 
Commission of Manpower Policy 1978 in Benner 2002). Indeed, various organisations 44 
throughout history have occupied this role in different forms. Fisher (1951) acknowledges the 45 
importance of labour contractors for supplying Chinese harvest workers during extreme 46 
seasonal fluctuations in demand in California as early as 1880 and later Mexican and Filipino 47 
workers through to the 1940s. Others have argued that certain types of LMIs - namely 48 
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employment agencies in the UK and temporary help firms in the US - were well established 49 
by the 1930s and had been used in London before World War I (Moore 1965). However, 50 
many agree that the use of these types of LMI’s became widespread after World War II and it 51 
was during this time that many of the largest contemporary employment agencies were 52 
established such as, Kelly Services and Manpower Inc. (Ward 2004). It was after the 1970’s 53 
that the use of LMIs in the UK and US really took off and spread steadily into Western 54 
Europe.   55 
Chris Benner provides one of the few in-depth explorations, from a geographical perspective, 56 
of multiple LMIs. In Work in the New Economy (2002) and Staircases or Treadmills? (2007)  57 
Benner and colleagues examine the role of different LMIs among groups of workers in the 58 
knowledge economy of Silicon Valley and in aiding low-wage workers in Milwaukee. 59 
Benner (2002, 2003) offers a more comprehensive definition of LMI’s which moves beyond 60 
the simple ‘matching up’ activities previously suggested and in addition considers four 61 
fundamental functions that LMIs perform within the labour market. These include: reducing 62 
transaction costs, shaping compensation levels, risk displacement (particularly onto workers) 63 
and network building. By considering these four actions Benner takes into account the 64 
traditional transaction cost approach but is also able to consider the wider non-market social 65 
relationships that shape the economic transactions between intermediaries and 66 
workers/employers and which are not driven solely by pricing and efficiency.  67 
Using this definition Benner (2002) identifies three types of LMI; private sector, 68 
membership-based and public sector. Public sector and membership-based intermediaries 69 
such as training/education institutions, professional guilds, trade associations and unions 70 
primarily aim to improve labour market outcomes for workers. In contrast, private sector 71 
LMIs generate profit by selling their services to employers and according to Coe and 72 
Jordhus-Lier (2010, 226) “represent a unique fraction of capital... that provides an 73 
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increasingly important range of labour market services”. Moreover, research has shown that 74 
within both low-end temporary and elite labour markets private profit-seeking LMIs are 75 
driving market development and changing employment norms (Peck & Theodore 2002; 76 
Faulconbridge et al. 2008). Whereas, public and membership-based intermediaries are more 77 
likely to emerge as a response to rapidly changing and volatile employment conditions 78 
(Benner 2002). Therefore, in order to understanding how LMIs are actively shaping labour 79 
markets, this paper focuses on private for-profit LMIs and reviews existing research on three 80 
types; those that focus on temporary (TSAs) and permanent (headhunters) work placements 81 
and those that function informally (gangmasters).  82 
Labour market intermediaries and flexibility 83 
The burgeoning use of LMIs by firms and workers should be understood within the wider 84 
context of neoliberal labour market deregulation and the rise of flexibility within labour 85 
market policy and corporate strategy. Flexibility remains a contested and value laden concept, 86 
holding different meanings depending on those analysing it (see, Buzar 2008) and there is 87 
insufficient room in this paper to unpack such a term. Nonetheless, we can learn a lot about 88 
the rapidly increasing use of private sector LMIs by exploring how others have analysed their 89 
role in relation to increasingly flexible labour markets. 90 
Many have critically examined the massive changes in employment and labour markets since 91 
the mid 1970s (Osterman 1999; Kalleberg 2001, 2009). This period of neoliberal reform has 92 
been characterised by intensified economic integration and global competition, the 93 
outsourcing of manufacturing and the concomitant emphasis on knowledge-intensive work 94 
(Kalleberg 2009). In turn, this has led to a systemic enforcement within public policy of 95 
flexibility initiatives designed to enhance the functioning of ‘frictionless’ markets (Crouch 96 
2010). The culmination of this has enhanced the need for firms to react quickly to market 97 
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fluctuations while externalising the costs of market downturns. Indeed the idea of the 98 
‘flexible firm’ has been used to describe different ways in which firms may adapt their 99 
human resource management strategies to better react to this multifaceted competition 100 
(Atkinson 1984; Atkinson & Meager 1986; Dale & Bamford 1988; Storper & Scott 1990; 101 
Peck 1996). This stream of public policy and corporate strategies aimed at enhanced 102 
flexibility within the labour market and the firm has shifted our ideological view of work 103 
away from the secure, unionised, life-long career common during the post-war era towards 104 
contractualised, individualised and often insecure employment. The growth of LMIs has been 105 
a response to this fever of flexibility as well as a compounding force for it. Benner (2002, 6) 106 
states that; 107 
Flexibility in regional labor [sic] markets contributes to the growth of intermediaries, which in 108 
turn help facilitate labor market flexibility – in essence labor market intermediaries are a 109 
fundamental feature of labor markets in the information economy.  110 
LMIs play a strategically important role in delivering labour market flexibility and can be 111 
used by firms in different ways to introduce flexibility into their corporate strategies. By 112 
providing firms with part-time or temporary workers temporary staffing agencies and 113 
contract brokers facilitate flexible staffing arrangements. They allow firms to make 114 
quantitative adjustments to their labour force quickly and easily through external numerical 115 
flexibility (see Kalleberg & Marsden 2005). Firms are also able to individualise employment 116 
relations and wage bargaining by weakening trade unions through the employment of 117 
temporary agency workers. Contract brokers can recruit independent contractors to undertake 118 
specialist tasks within the firm without tying them to restrictive employment contracts thus 119 
easing hiring and firing within firms. Firms may also recruit multi-skilled workers through 120 
LMIs which can be deployed throughout the workplace allowing greater internal functional 121 
flexibility. Other LMIs such as employment agencies and headhunters are expanding their 122 
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remit of activities to facilitate labour market flexibility for both firms and workers and further 123 
aid in the navigation of complex and unpredictable labour markets. Firms - in particular small 124 
firms - may also introduce flexibility into their corporate strategies by forming networks or 125 
strategic alliances with other firms (Bryson et al. 1999) or through the externalisation 126 
(subcontracting) of certain services which can include recruitment via LMIs. 127 
Their increasing role as purveyors of flexibility means intermediary institutions are reshaping 128 
the dynamics of flexible labour markets (Peck & Theodore 2007). Moreover, the presence of 129 
some LMIs, especially temporary staffing agencies, in nearly all countries and across a 130 
growing number of sectors means that these LMIs provide both firms and policy makers with 131 
a new institutional medium through which to enhance the flexibility of labour markets. In 132 
many cases this means off-loading the risks of increased economic uncertainty onto workers 133 
(Allen & Henry 1997; Peck & Theodore 2002). 134 
Temporary staffing agencies and contact brokers 135 
Temporary staffing agencies (aka temporary help firms/temporary work agencies) and 136 
contract brokers facilitate the outsourcing of jobs to workers on open-ended contracts with 137 
limited fringe benefits. Although the name suggests short-term placements, ‘temps’ or 138 
‘contractors’ can be employed on long-term or rolling contracts referred to as ‘permatemps’. 139 
This can vary depending on national regulations, for example; in the Netherlands temps have 140 
the right to a permanent contract after 3.5 years, whereas, in France the average duration of a 141 
temporary work assignment is 9.5 days (UNITE 2007). These LMIs can also be used by firms 142 
to screen potential permanent employees through ‘temp-to-perm’ agreements (Ward et al. 143 
2001; Theodore & Peck 2002; Benner et al. 2003). Yet, the degree to which these initiatives 144 
increase the chance of temps being employed permanently are debatable as the work by 145 
Amuedo-Dorantes (2000) on temporary workers in Spain demonstrates. Research has shown 146 
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that routine, peripheral work (e.g. call centre workers or production/warehouse operatives) 147 
and outside expert jobs, especially those where skills are required only periodically (e.g. web 148 
developers), lend themselves particularly well to outsourcing via this type of intermediary 149 
(Purcell et al. 2004). 150 
Employers utilise these arrangements as a strategic alternative to direct employment during 151 
fluctuations in demand, to cover short term absenteeism, when (non-firm-specific) expert 152 
skills are required, for seasonal agricultural work or unsociable shifts patterns (Peck & 153 
Theodore 1998; McDowell et al. 2009). These intermediaries charge client firms a fee based 154 
on the hourly wage of each temp. Although hourly rates are not necessarily cheaper clients 155 
often make cost savings through benefit reductions, lower exit costs and minimal screening 156 
and training (Purcell et al. 2004). TSAs and contract brokers can be characterised by the 157 
triangular relationship between the LMI, the temporary employee and the client firm (Gonos 158 
1997; Forde 2001; Druker & Stanworth 2004). This relationship creates distinctive dynamics 159 
vis-à-vis direct employment. For example, Gottfried (1991, 1992) notes the duel mechanisms 160 
of control imposed on her as a temporary worker during participant observation in Midwest 161 
America. Van Breugel et al. (2005) discuss the commitment of contingent workers towards 162 
host organisations in the Netherlands. And Forde (2001) has considered the deepening 163 
functional integration between TSAs and clients in the UK which allow the intermediary 164 
principal control over recruitment functions and an on-site presence at the client company 165 
(see also Ward 2003, 2004). These issues can blur the boundaries of the firm and distinctions 166 
between internal and external labour markets (Peck & Theodore 1998). 167 
The regulation of TSAs and contract brokers varies across countries. The US and UK have 168 
embraced projects of re-regulation such as the redesign of social-welfare, employment 169 
policies and labour and industrial relations laws in order to accommodate the use of TSAs. 170 
This has led to thriving industries for temporary staffing which currently represent the first 171 
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(27% total annual sales) and third (9%) largest markets respectively. Some labour advocates 172 
have since campaigned for the legal reclassification and legislative reform of agencies in 173 
these countries in order to “effectuate a fair regime of regulation for these formidable 174 
players” (Freedland 2003; Freeman & Gonos 2005, 295). Other countries in Europe such as 175 
France, Germany and the Scandinavian nations have been more cautious about their 176 
liberalisation of employment regulation, nonetheless the temporary staffing industry in these 177 
countries has been growing quickly since the early 1990s (Peck et al. 2005). Other countries 178 
such as Italy, Japan, Greece, Belgium and the Netherlands began developing regulatory 179 
frameworks conducive to temporary staffing only after the International Labour Organisation 180 
(ILO) passed convention 181 in 1997. This convention explicitly acknowledge the 181 
constructive role of private employment agencies in the functioning of labour markets thus 182 
giving these LMI’s a regulatory green light and sparking further growth within Europe and 183 
other countries (Peck et al. 2005). Today countries such as Brazil and South Africa are 184 
showing rapid growth in private employment agencies while Japan recently emerged as the 185 
second largest market for agency work representing 19% of the world market (Ciett 2012). 186 
It has been argued that the LMIs that supply temporary workers are polarised between TSAs 187 
which supply low-skilled ‘temps’ and contract brokers that supply specialist temporary 188 
workers (Peck & Theodore 1998, 2001; McDowell et al. 2008). In most cases specialist 189 
contract brokers emphasise a value added approach, quality of service and customised supply 190 
in the interests of the client company and employees (Purcell et al. 2004). Contracting has 191 
long been popular in industries such as construction which is dominated by small and 192 
medium sized companies meaning the division of labour is such that large companies act as 193 
general contractors while others are usually subcontractors committed only for the duration of 194 
individual projects (Fellini et al. 2007). Fellini et al. (2007) discuss the role of contracting 195 
within the construction industry in Italy, Portugal, Germany, the UK, the Netherlands and 196 
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Switzerland and argue that recruitment agencies (the Netherlands) and subcontractors (Italy 197 
and Portugal) within the construction industry can have a significant impact on migration 198 
flows in different countries. Contracting has also become increasingly widespread amongst 199 
business services, engineering and management services both in the US and Europe since the 200 
1970’s (Kalleberg 2000). Skilled technicians and IT professionals placed by contract brokers 201 
often act as self-employed or independent contractors affording them greater autonomy than 202 
lower-skilled ‘temps’ (Benner 2002; Purcell et al. 2004). Contractors can benefit from being 203 
employed via a LMI, for example; Pearce (1993 in Van Breugel et al. 2005) found that 204 
aerospace contractors in a large US company earned more than regular employees in the 205 
same positions. Furthermore, Benner (2002) notes that contract brokerage firms allow 206 
specialised consultants to market themselves (through the intermediary) to a higher number 207 
of clients and provide an important service in the knowledge economy. Consequently, highly 208 
skilled workers working on a temporary basis often benefit from using contract brokers and 209 
may prefer this to permanent work (Benner 2002).  210 
In contrast, TSAs pursue a low-margin high-volume business strategy by placing large pools 211 
of low-skilled labour, emphasis is placed on cost, speed and “hassle reduction”. This is 212 
illustrated particularly well in Peck and Theodore’s (1998, 2001) study of the back-street 213 
Hiring Halls of Chicago – Americas heartland of temporary staffing. The characteristically 214 
thin margins of the temporary staffing industry (TSI) have led to aggressive strategies of 215 
diversification and internationalisation which Ward (2004) explores with reference to some 216 
of the world’s largest TSAs namely Adecco, Manpower Inc., Randstad, Kelly Services and 217 
Vedior (see also Coe et al. 2007). While highly skilled workers often benefit from using 218 
contract brokers McDowell et al. (2009) argue that low-skilled workers employed via TSAs 219 
are some of the most vulnerable. The emphasis on price and the inherent threat of 220 
competition within the TSI means many of the risks faced by agencies are passed onto 221 
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workers (Allen & Henry 1997). Furthermore, by carrying out discriminatory hiring practices 222 
and other unscrupulous client demands Peck and Theodore (1998) found that TSAs can 223 
actually institutionalise inequality and reify tendencies of segmentation creating hierarchies 224 
of inequality and new types of workforce stratification amongst the most vulnerable workers. 225 
In addition to the mass of LMIs which place large pools of low-skilled workers particularly 226 
within the clerical and light industrial sectors, it is possible to identify employment agencies 227 
across all sectors that recruit and place different types of workers. Furthermore, Coe and 228 
Jordhus-Lier (2010) argue that neoliberal restructuring has opened up a huge market for 229 
staffing agencies in the public sector. Indeed, there is a growing prevalence of these LMIs 230 
that place teachers, locums, health care professional and other public servants within local 231 
councils and other public organisations. For example, McDowell et al. (2009) discuss the 232 
experiences of economic migrants from the European Union that work for the NHS via 233 
employment agencies. 234 
The continued geographical and sectoral spread of the temporary staffing industry has led to a 235 
rapidly developing body of research in economic geography. Coe et al. (2010) provide an 236 
insightful review of this literature in this journal and suggested four areas of future research. 237 
Namely, i) how TSAs ‘make a difference’ and construct markets by reshaping employment 238 
norms, expanding into new sectors and countries and engaging in the political sphere; ii) the 239 
fine grained ways in which wider labour market regimes shape nationally distinctive 240 
temporary staffing markets. Some have argued that a city-by-city analysis of regionally 241 
distinctive temporary staffing markets is also important (Peck & Theodore 2002; Ward 242 
2005); iii) how the market for temporary staffing expands geographically and why, how, 243 
where and with what effects the temporary staffing industry is globalising; and iv) the role 244 
played by TSAs in the mediation of migration. Significant inroads have been made to this 245 
agenda not least in research which has considered the thousands of labour recruiters within 246 
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Asia and their role as ex-porters of labour and the subsequent impact on the global flow of 247 
migrant labour. For example, Tyner (1998) explores labour recruitment websites in Asia and 248 
their impact on the spatial organisation of international labour migration particularly in the 249 
deployment of domestic workers such as nannies and carers. Tyner argues that statistical 250 
prejudgments by agencies can contribute to the gendered and racialised patterns of labour 251 
migration. Moreover, Ho and Tyson (2011) argue that labour recruitment agencies play a 252 
crucial role as facilitators of emigration into some Asian countries and create one of the 253 
major regional pathways of migration in Singapore particularly amongst skilled and unskilled 254 
labourers.  255 
The TSI represents itself as a passive market-enhancing service provider representing and 256 
reconciling the needs of supply (labours desire for non-standard) and demand (employers 257 
additional labour requirements). However, Peck and Theodore (2002, 147) argue that the TSI 258 
is in fact an “active intermediary in the job market”. They state that TSAs make their markets 259 
by providing new employment solutions and enhanced flexibility to firms. This has led to a 260 
host of insecure and precarious characteristics now associated with many national labour 261 
markets, such as; two tier compensation systems in manufacturing, the normalisation of pre-262 
screening in clerical and administration work, deunionisation, the erosion of employer-263 
sponsored benefits, the displacement of risk onto workers, lean workforce systems, the 264 
casualisation of public sector jobs and the restructuring of incentive systems (Peck & 265 
Theodore 2002). Far from the passive intermediary the industry would have us believe TSAs 266 
have had a huge impact on our labour markets. 267 
Executive search firms and headhunters 268 
Outside of temporary work, executive search agencies and headhunters play a pivotal role in 269 
the supply of specialised highly-skilled workers for permanent positions. Although the 270 
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function of TSAs within low-end labour markets has encouraged critical debate, “at the 271 
opposite end of the labour market, there remains an absence of scholarship” (Faulconbridge 272 
et al. 2008, 211). However, within economic geography Beaverstock, Faulconbridge and Hall 273 
have begun to address this “troubling void” and examine the strategies and influence of 274 
executive search agencies in elite labour markets (ibid). In contrast to TSAs and contract 275 
brokers these LMIs are used to find highly-skilled permanent workers for the core workforce 276 
or those at the pinnacle of organisational hierarchies (Faulconbridge et al. 2009). In the 277 
highest echelons of these secretive intermediaries executive search firms charge a fee in 278 
advance of any placement and many refuse jobs with a starting salary below £100,000. There 279 
are an estimated 5,000 of these executive search firms worldwide and some of the leading 280 
firms include Heidrick & Struggles, Korn/Ferry, Spencer Stuart, Egon Zehnder, Russell 281 
Reynolds and Globe (Jenn 2005).  282 
These intermediaries have been particularly important in the “war for talent” (see Michaels et 283 
al. in Faulconbridge et al. 2009, 800) as emphasis is placed on the need to recruit talented 284 
executives that can drive innovation and increase profitability in the knowledge economy. 285 
This process is intensified by the growth of “mobile talent” as experts are “poached” from 286 
rival firms in order to avoid missing-out on new ideas and star candidates from outside the 287 
internal labour market (Faulconbridge et al. 2008, 214-217). As such, headhunters and 288 
executive search firms provide highly specialised, value added networks which tap into 289 
geographically dispersed elite labour markets and find talented candidates. Vinodrai (2006) 290 
argues that in niche industries these intermediaries may be less effective. For example, in 291 
Toronto’s design industry the fuzzy boundaries of the occupation cause confusion among 292 
some larger headhunting firms that do not understand the industry, rendering them of little 293 
use to designers. However, headhunters and executive search firms are now present in many 294 
professional and extremely specialised industries with boutique consultancies in niche sectors 295 
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or large agencies with specialist divisions covering sectors from the oil and gas industry to 296 
Chinese equity analysts to particular niches of the bio-tech sector (Jenn 2005; Faulconbridge 297 
et al. 2009). 298 
As is the case with TSAs, Headhunters and executive search firms play an active role in 299 
shaping employment relations, changing recruitment practices and creating markets. 300 
Faulconbridge et al. (2008) argue that headhunters reproduce demand for their services 301 
through internationalisation of the industry which allows them to promote market-making 302 
rhetoric, navigate best practice guideline restrictions and promulgate the legitimacy of 303 
headhunting above direct recruitment. The tactics used in the geographical spread of the elite 304 
search industry depend on and reproduce rhetoric associated with the knowledge economy. 305 
Headhunters ensure that corporations entrust the search for their highest executives to elite 306 
search agencies in the belief that there is little alternative and without these intermediaries 307 
they risk inefficient recruitment, losing out on the best candidates and ultimately compromise 308 
their competitiveness. As such, Faulconbridge et al. (2008) argue that headhunters have 309 
cultivated the awareness of and desire for headhunting across different geographical markets. 310 
Further to this, Faulconbridge et al. (2009, 801) argue that executive search firms play a 311 
significant role in defining the nature of ‘talent’ thus “determining who does and does not 312 
classify as a talented individual”. They refer to this at a “new boys network” in which skilled 313 
workers are required to meet key markers of cultural capital and ‘talent’ determined by 314 
headhunters. This creates a “geographically inscribed hierarchy and exclusiveness” and  315 
means that certain candidates dominate at the expense of those that do not fit the markers set 316 
by headhunters (Faulconbridge et al. 2009, 807). As such, the proliferation of executive 317 
search firms within elite labour markets means certain skilled workers may be marginalised 318 
and disadvantaged along lines determined by LMIs.  319 
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Beaverstock et al. (2010) and Hall et al. (2009) also examine the ways in which elite search 320 
agencies embed themselves in labour markets. They analyse the expansion and 321 
internationalisation strategies of executive search firms and consider the ‘softer’ processes of 322 
‘professionalization’ and ‘legitimization’. They argue that these softer processes such as 323 
reputation building and creating a culture of acceptance require greater attention when 324 
considering the strategies of unbounded professions. Earlier work by Clark (1993) suggests 325 
that minimal barriers to entry create distinctive characteristics within the executive 326 
recruitment industry and as a result there is a mix of high and low quality consultants in the 327 
UK. Therefore, trust producing mechanisms such as contingent fees, reputation (corporate 328 
and individual) and regulation (contractual agreements) of the executive recruitment industry 329 
are important in mitigating decline in service quality and possible market collapse.  330 
There are similarities between intermediaries that specialise in permanent and temporary 331 
recruitment not least the focus on profit-driven employer centric services, minimal barriers to 332 
entry and the off-setting of risk onto workers. Furthermore, their growing diversification and 333 
internationalisation into numerous countries and sectors of the labour market leave most with 334 
little choice but to utilise their services in some form. However, intermediary organisations 335 
and their actions do not always exist within formal or regulated spheres. The following 336 
section provides an overview of the approaches and emerging research amongst informal 337 
intermediaries, specifically the practices of gangmasters in the UK. 338 
Informal intermediaries 339 
Perhaps the most well-known account of informal for-profit LMIs in the UK is associated 340 
with the drowning of 23 cockle pickers in Morecombe Bay in 2004 that were recruited and 341 
organised via a gangmaster. The gangmaster was convicted for their manslaughter while the 342 
owners of the company that traded the cockles faced no charges as the ‘indirect’ employers of 343 
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the cocklers – a bleak yet lucid illustration of the offset risks afforded to employers by some 344 
LMIs. A recent report by Oxfam states that “workers employed through gangmasters are 345 
some of the most vulnerable and exploited in the UK” (Oxfam 2009, 1). Yet, this group of 346 
workers and the associated gangmasters have received little attention in labour geography and 347 
could be considered as one of the “often-neglected groups” within the discipline (Lier 2007, 348 
829). This is surprising considering the UK’s resurgent use of gangmasters since the 1980s - 349 
far from a historic relic of the feudal system nor confined to the gruelling work regimes of 350 
less developed countries – gangmasters are a fundamental feature of capitalist agriculture and 351 
have become a common and necessary intermediary for many unskilled workers and 352 
employers within agribusiness enterprises (Brass 2004). The work by Strauss (2012b, 2) has 353 
begun to address this as she considers the resurgence and social reproduction of gang labour 354 
in the UK in relation to “neoliberal imperatives to create flexible labour markets”. 355 
The Gangmasters Licensing Authority (GLA) was established in 2004 to officially license 356 
labour providers in agriculture, horticulture, food processing, shellfish gathering and forestry 357 
sectors thus protecting workers and employers by ensuring that gangmasters operated within 358 
the law.  However, its success in reducing the exploitative nature of gang labour especially 359 
within supermarket supply-chain agriculture is questionable (see Strauss 2009, 2012b). 360 
Moreover, Oxfam reports that abuses by unlicensed, informal gangmasters still exist in 361 
sectors beyond its remit (for example in construction, hospitality and care) and against 362 
workers fearful of whistle blowing. Indeed, the fuzzy boundaries and limited regulation 363 
concerning the activities of informal gangmasters requires greater theoretical and empirical 364 
exploration. Furthermore, Strauss (2012b) promotes further research on the scalar 365 
complexities of gang labour which take into account the regional and national institutions and 366 
regulation that mediate the processes of work.  367 
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There are strong ties between gangmasters and the use of migrant workers (see Kuptsch 368 
2006). Evidence presented by Oxfam suggests that individual and organised networks of 369 
gangmasters encourage workers to move to the UK by facilitating travel, accommodation and 370 
employment. These practices are often associated with illegal and exploitative practices such 371 
as forced or coerced labour, smuggling and trafficking (Schmidt 2006; Oxfam 2009). This 372 
has been compounded by EU accession and the influx of Eastern European workers, both 373 
independently and via gangmasters. During this time in 2004 reports of abuse by 374 
intermediary organisations increased markedly (Oxfam 2009). Indeed, McDowell et al. 375 
(2009) argue that economic migrants are often forced to accept the most precarious jobs 376 
while limited regulation in the UK labour market (compared with the rest of Europe) has led 377 
to competition among the migrant workforce for casual positions at the ‘bottom-end’ of the 378 
labour market. Moreover, Andrees (2006) reports that the vast majority of migrant workers 379 
that use intermediaries are using informal employment agencies and gangmasters1 and are 380 
more likely to experience coercion and forced labour as a result. 381 
The practices of gangmasters and their role in the exploitation of migrant workers have been 382 
portrayed in films such as It’s a Free World (2007) by Ken Loach and Ghosts (2006) by Nick 383 
Broomfield. However, the practices of these agents and their role in the movement of workers 384 
over national borders is one of the most under researched topics in migration research 385 
(Kuptsch 2006). Further research within economic geography on the role of gangmasters in 386 
the UK might also draw on discussions and evidence from the temporary staffing literature 387 
and in particular the role of these organisations in the migration of Asian workers in domestic 388 
jobs and the institutionalisation of gendered and racial segmentation as well as the inevitable 389 
links with existing work on coerced and forced labour (see Strauss 2012a).  390 
Conclusion: LMIs and labour geography  391 
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This paper has critically reviewed the literature on three broad types of LMI and provides one 392 
of the few attempts to discuss the impacts of multiple LMIs in one place. It has demonstrated 393 
that the role of LMIs within out labour markets is varied but nonetheless, there are few 394 
employees or employers that can avoid these organisations in some form. Crucially though, 395 
in reviewing the literature on LMIs this paper has highlighted that across both temporary and 396 
permanent employment and below the formal regulation or protection of national regulation 397 
LMIs play an active role in shaping how people are employed, who gets employed and where 398 
people are employed. Moreover, the research has shown that LMIs need to be understood as a 399 
growing institution within the labour market the presence of which cannot be ignored in 400 
future studies of labour or employment. As a means of drawing these approaches together, 401 
here I suggest directions for future research within labour geography.  402 
The sub-discipline of labour geography is dedicated to understanding labour as an active 403 
maker of social space and has developed a diverse body of research with “an explicit focus 404 
on the spatiality of particular worker struggles” (Lier 2007, 821 see also Castree et al. 2004; 405 
Castree 2007; Rogaly 2009). As labour geography continues to develop and extend its areas 406 
of analysis, the agency of labour has come under increasing scrutiny. In an attempt to move 407 
beyond the rather abstract discussions of labour agency Coe and Jordhus-Lier (2010) 408 
encourage a re-embedded understanding of labour agency through further study of four social 409 
arenas that are fundamental to labour and its political organisation, these are: capital, the 410 
state, the community and labour market intermediaries. They offer an analytical path for 411 
labour geography which requires future research to reconnect the agency of labour with the 412 
economic and societal systems that surround workers. Hence, taking account of the existing 413 
research as well as Coe and Jordhus-Lier’s proposition I suggest the following research 414 
agenda to help understand what role geography may play in the relationship between LMIs 415 
and the agency of labour. 416 
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First, future research on LMIs should consider how these organisations are changing the 417 
spatial dynamics of labour agency. LMIs have created a distance between the employee and 418 
the employer both spatially – as workers move between multiple workplaces – and 419 
emotionally – as workers have little industrial relations contact with their “real employer” 420 
(Wills 2009, 444). This creates structural disempowerment for workers because the mutual 421 
dependency between worker and employer is severed by the intermediary thus making 422 
collective bargaining impractical (Wills 2009). Wills argues that workers need to navigate the 423 
intermediary and find new ways of bargaining with their real employer. She presents 424 
examples of alliance-building between workers and groups at different geographical scales 425 
which have allowed workers to target their real employers and improve working conditions 426 
and wages. Future research should therefore give greater consideration to how LMIs disrupt 427 
conventional employment relationships and in turn affect the spatiality of labour agency i.e. 428 
where and towards which actors agency is directed.  429 
Furthermore, Lier (2007, 826) notes the tendency for research in labour geography to 430 
“overlook worker agency that is not articulated as collectively organised”. However, LMIs 431 
provide workers greater opportunity to express individual agency and improve their 432 
experience of work. For example, the use of contract brokers by skilled workers improves 433 
their ability to approach multiple employers thus increasing employment choice and allowing 434 
for greater individual worker agency. While, limited contractual restrictions on temporary 435 
contracts allow temps to move between different TSAs in order to gain better hourly rates – 436 
although still disadvantaged by the precarious nature of agency work – this demonstrates how 437 
LMIs allow workers to move quickly to ‘better’ jobs thus demonstrating individual worker 438 
agency. Moreover, James and Vira (2012) document the strategic use of a diverse range of 439 
LMIs by call centre workers in India used to circumvent limited internal job ladders and 440 
19 
 
move to better paid more favourable jobs in other companies, another example of individual 441 
worker agency facilitated by LMIs.  442 
Hence, future research on LMIs should consider their influence on worker mobility and the 443 
effect this has on worker agency. Coe and Jordhus-Lier (2010, 218) identify that “strategies 444 
for matching capital’s (potential) mobility” are an essential aspect of the agency of labour. 445 
This paper has shown that informal LMIs present a particularly important group in this 446 
respect. As such, it is therefore important that future research also accounts for the role of 447 
formal and informal LMIs in mediating the movement of workers and reshaping worker 448 
agency amongst migrant and other mobile workers. In the facilitation of migration LMIs are 449 
actively reshaping the spatialities of worker mobility thus having a dramatic effect both in 450 
constraining and enhancing worker agency.  451 
Finally, there has been a tendency for research on LMIs to focus on North America and 452 
Western Europe. Research on TSAs has made the biggest contribution in moving beyond 453 
these industry heartlands to consider ‘temping’ in Eastern Europe (Coe et al. 2008), Australia 454 
(Coe et al. 2009a), Sweden (Coe et al. 2009b) and Canada (Vosko 2000). Yet, there has been 455 
little work which considers the role of TSAs within the global South. James and Vira (2012) 456 
and Endresen (2010) provide noteworthy exceptions to this regarding the role of LMIs in the 457 
career progression of call centre workers in India and labour hire agencies in Namibia, 458 
respectively. Nonetheless, the study of other LMIs would benefit from further work on their 459 
impact beyond the US and Western Europe. Furthermore, future research may benefit from 460 
studies which consider the links between a broader range of LMIs. For example, the use of 461 
interned-base job-boards which have become a “standard component in many job search 462 
strategies” (Benner 2002, 117) yet, have received little attention for their impact on workers 463 
experiences and labour market functioning. 464 
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